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TESTING THE LIMITS OF THE FEDERAL
NAVIGATIONAL SERVITUDE
Genevieve Pisarskla
I. INTRODUCTION
Under its constitutional power over foreign and interstate commerce,1
the United States has authority over control and improvement of naviga-
tion.2 This authority has been interpreted as conferring on the United
States the navigational servitude,3 a dominant servitude on land within the
boundaries of navigable waters that entitles the United States to use the
land for purposes related to navigation and commerce, regardless of
ownership and without compensation.'
The Aquatic Resources Division of the Washington State Department
of Natural Resources, manager of the state's aquatic public lands, recently
completed a study of the nature and scope of state and federal rights in
aquatic lands, including the federal navigational servitude. The purpose
of the study was to develop a set of guidelines to apply at specific sites.
The study disclosed a set of factors that appear to define the substantive
and procedural legitimacy of actions taken under the federal navigational
servitude and revealed how the factors coalesce into a six-part test to
determine the validity of these government activities.
* J.D. December 1996, Seattle University School of Law. Policy Analyst for the
Aquatic Resources Division, Washington Department of Natural Resources.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
2. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70
U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1865); United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967).
3. See 3 AmmucAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 12.27 (A. James Casner, ed. 1952); and
James M. McElfish, Jr., Property Rights and Wetlands Regulation, SA83 ALI-ABA 439,
453-55 (May 1996) for a definition of the navigational servitude and a list of acts that
qualify for protection under the servitude.
4. See 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 3, § 12.31; Fed. Power
Comm'n v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239, 246-48 (1954).
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This Comment grew out of the study and its findings. Part II of the
Comment reviews the basis and nature of the navigational servitude. Part
III examines the factors that define the scope of the servitude. Part IV
describes how these factors coalesce into a six-part test to decide if
government activities are protected under the navigational servitude. Part
V concludes that while the navigational servitude is used in conjunction
with the Takings Clause 5 there is a separate and discernible process that
is due when the United States attempts to take the use of property located
within navigable waters. The United States must demonstrate that it is
taking only property originally located within navigable waters and absent
a congressional waiver, the government must have a Commerce Clause
purpose of furthering navigation. Furthermore, in addition to meeting the
requirements of the six-part test, governmental actions taken under the
navigational servitude must be reasonable and afford property owners
fundamental due process rights.
II. THE BASIS AND NATURE OF THE NAVIGATIONAL SERVITUDE
The navigational servitude, interpreted as an incident of the historical
public right of navigation,6 has become a doctrine of federal power under
the Commerce Clause. 7 The navigational servitude, under that name, is
a relatively modem doctrine developed by the Supreme Court.8 It was
first described as a power and later categorized as a servitude. In United
States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co.,9 the Court
described the servitude in these terms:
The dominant power of the federal Government, as has been
repeatedly held, extends to the entire bed of a stream, which
includes the lands below ordinary high-water mark. The exercise
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
6. United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950); United States
v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 312 U.S. 592 (1941); United States v.
Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1912).
7. Fed. Power Comm'n v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239, 249,
(1954). A concurrent state servitude has been recognized. See Wernberg v. State, 516
P.2d 1191 (Alaska 1973); Daniel J. Morgan & David G. Lewis, The State Navigation
Servitude, 4 LAND & WATER L. REv. 521, 522-23 (1969).
8. William J. Powell, Just Compensation and the Navigation Power, 31 WASH. L.
REv. 271 (1956).
9. 312 U.S. 592 (1941).
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of the power within these limits is not an invasion of any private
property right in such lands for which the United States must
make compensation. The damage sustained results not from a
taking of the riparian owner's property in the stream bed, but
from the lawful exercise of a power to which that property has
always been subject. 10
In United States v. Kansas City Life Insurance Co., the Court
characterized the power more precisely as a servitude incidental to the
federal commerce power:
It is not the broad constitutional power to regulate commerce, but
rather the servitude derived from that power and narrower in
scope, that frees the Government from liability in these cases.
When the Government exercises this servitude, it is exercising its
paramount power in the interest of navigation, rather than taking
the private property of anyone.... There thus has been ample
notice over the years that such property is subject to a dominant
public interest. This right of the public has crystallized in terms
of a servitude over the bed of the stream.... Accordingly, it is
consistent with the history and reason of the rule to deny compen-
sation where the claimant's private title is burdened with this
servitude but to award compensation where his title is not so
burdened. 12
The nature of the interest that the federal government holds in
connection with the navigational servitude is generally described, either
explicitly or impliedly, as an easement. The nature of this property right
falls short of fee title. 3 In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the
federal government has no need for title to aquatic lands because "the
United States retains a navigational easement in the navigable waters lying
within the described boundaries for the benefit of the public, regardless
of who owns the riverbed." 4
10. Id. at 596-97 (footnote omitted).
11. 339 U.S. 799 (1950).
12. Id. at 808.
13. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 141 (1937).
14. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 555, (1981). See also Choctaw Nation
v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1970) (indicating that the federal government had all it was
concerned with in its navigational easement via the constitutional power over commerce)
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Thus, any interest in real property, if it is subject to the public right
of navigation and to federal regulation, is burdened by the navigational
servitude. It is a dominant interest, 5 and any other property interests are
servient. Whether the state or a private individual owns the bed of a
stream or has other interests in navigable waterways legally protected
under state law is evidently immaterial.16
The federal navigational servitude is paramount to all other interests
in navigable waters. The courts have found alteration or destruction of
structures, interference with right of access, and interference with fee
simple title all within the scope of the servitude. For example, when the
federal government took over a ferry terminal it considered an obstruc-
tion, the court found it immaterial whether there was alteration or
destruction of the impediment. 7 Likewise, United States v. Chicago,
Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co. held that no compensation was due
for injury to structures located between high and low water marks caused
by raising the water level for improvement of navigation, because any
structure so situated is placed at risk, regardless of whether the structure
itself has any relation to or effect on navigation.'8 Similarly, where access
was blocked by construction of a government pier, the court found that
the:
primary use of the waters and the lands under them is for pur-
poses of navigation, and the erection of piers in them to improve
navigation for the public is entirely consistent with such use, and
infringes no right of the riparian owner. Whatever the nature of
the interest of a riparian owner in the submerged lands in front
of his upland bordering on a public navigable water, his title is
not as full and complete as his title to fast land which has no
(emphasis added).
15. The Court explained the navigational servitude as "[tihe power is a privilege
which we have called 'a dominant servitude' or 'a superior navigation easement.'" United
States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 225 (1956) (citations omitted) (quoting
United States v. Commodore Park, Inc., 324 U.S. 386, 391 (1945); Fed. Power Comm'n
v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239, 249 (1954); United States v. Gerlach
Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 729 (1950)).
16. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 510 (1945). See also
Powell, supra note 8, at 274.
17. United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 666 F.2d 1236, 1238, 1241 (9th Cir.
1982).
18. 312 U.S. 592, 599 (1941).
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direct connection with the navigation of such water. It is a
qualified title, a bare technical title, not at his absolute disposal,
as is his upland, but to be held at all times subordinate to such
use of the submerged lands and of the waters flowing over them
as may be consistent with or demanded by the public right of
navigation. 19
The servitude was also held to supersede fee simple title, where
deepening the channel across a navigable bay destroyed oysters belonging
to the lessee of an owner in fee.
This right to control, improve and regulate the navigation of such
waters is one of the greatest of the powers delegated to the
United States by the power to regulate commerce....
By necessary implication from the dominant right of navigation,
title to such submerged lands is acquired and held subject to the
power of Congress to deepen the water over such lands or to use
them for any structure which the interest of navigation, in its
judgment, may require.'
Where the owner is a state rather than a private party, the result would
probably be the same. The Court has ruled that "whether, under local
law, the title to the bed of the stream is retained by the State or... the
riparian owner..., the rights of the title holder are subordinate to the
dominant power of the federal Government in respect of navigation." 21
Although the navigational servitude gives the federal government a
dominant easement over private property interests, it appears that public
rights in navigable waters, place the navigational servitude outside the
scope of the Takings Clause. '
Since private property rights cannot arise, either by prescription,
estoppel or express grant, in derogation of the Constitution or the
common law customary servitudes of the public at large, they
19. Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141, 163-64 (1900).
20. Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82, 87-88 (1913).
28 U.S.C. § 1497 (1994) subsequently provided for compensation in this situation. See
Powell, supra note 8, at 276 n.31.
21. United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 312 U.S. at
596. See also Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 555 (1981); United States v.
422,978 Square Feet of Land, 445 F.2d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 1971).
22. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
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may be curtailed without compensation at any time such curtail-
ment is required for the protection of these paramount publicinterests. z3
The proper exercise of this power is not an invasion of any
private property rights in the stream or the lands underlying it,
for the damage sustained does not result from taking property
from riparian owners within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment
but from the lawful exercise of a power to which the interests of
riparian owners have always been subject.'
The U.S. Supreme Court has also refused to view the navigational
servitude as a power subject to balancing tests. In United States v.
Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma,' a unanimous Court reversed a lower
court's attempt to balance public and private interests to determine if the
servitude was sufficient to preclude compensation.' The Court ruled that
an Indian tribe's fee simple title to a riverbed, pursuant to treaties with the
United States, was subject to the navigational servitude.' The Tribe
claimed that compensation was due for damage to sand and gravel
deposits resulting from construction of a channel to improve navigation of
the Arkansas River.' The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that
the servitude superseded only ownership rights related to navigation.29
Although the Cherokee Nation could not interfere with the exercise of the
servitude, it could claim compensation for interests unrelated to naviga-
tion.30 The lower court reasoned that "[w]hen the exercise of that public
power affects private ownership rights not connected to a navigational
use, the court must balance the public and private interests to decide
whether just compensation is due." 31
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, held that a balancing test could
not be applied in this case, because there was no invasion of any private
23. AMERiCAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 3, at § 28.59 (emphasis added).
24. United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 123 (1967) (citing United States v.
Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 312 U.S. at 596-97; Gibson v. United
States, 166 U.S. 269, 275-76 (1897)).
25. 480 U.S. 700 (1987).
26. Id. at 704-05.
27. Id. at 706-08.
28. Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. United States, 782 F.2d 871 (10th Cir. 1986).
29. Id. at 875-76.
30. Id. at 879.
31. Id. at 877.
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property right.32 The navigational servitude dominated any riverbed
interests regardless of how acquired or who held title.33
In Cherokee Nation, the Tenth Circuit apparently attempted to
establish its balancing test based on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Kaiser Aetna v. United States. In the case, the Court held that even
though a private marina fell within the definition of navigable waters
(after it was connected to the Pacific Ocean) and was subject to regulation
by the Corps of Engineers, its owners could not be required to open it to
the public without compensation.' The Court found that:
all of this Court's cases dealing with the authority of Congress to
regulate navigation and the so-called "navigational servitude"
cannot simply be lumped into one basket .... "[A]ny reliance
upon judicial precedent must be predicated upon careful appraisal
of the purpose for which the concept of 'navigability' was
invoked in a particular case."35
The Kaiser Aetna marina became a navigable water body when the
owners of a shallow pond-private property under Hawaiian law-
dredged it and connected it to an adjoining bay. The Court did not
question that Commerce Clause power over navigable waters was broad
enough to authorize regulation of the marina36 or to assure public access.3
However, the Court did not believe that the navigational servitude was
broad enough to require public access without compensation. Addressing
the nature and scope of the servitude, the Court drew a distinction
between the scope of the commerce power and the reach of the servitude's
exception to the Takings Clause by finding: "[T]his Court has never held
that the navigational servitude creates a blanket exception to the Takings
Clause whenever Congress exercises its Commerce Clause authority to
promote navigation." 38 The government's attempt to create a public right
of access went far beyond ordinary regulation and improvement for
32. Id.
33. Id. at 705-06.
34. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
35. Id. at 170-71 (quoting United States v. Kaiser Aetna, 408 F. Supp. 42, 48-49 (D.
Haw. 1976)).
36. Id. at 174.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 172.
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navigation.39 Likewise, the water body in question was not considered to
be a highway of commerce. It was "not the sort of 'great navigable
stream' . . recognized as being '[incapable] of private ownership'"' and
had been considered private property under state law. The property
interest of the owners was "similar to that of owners of fast land adjacent
to navigable water."41 Under these circumstances, the navigational
servitude would not supersede private ownership rights in furtherance of
a regulatory power but would simply be an invasion of private property
requiring compensation.42
The Tenth Circuit in Cherokee Nation, interpreted the Kaiser Aetna
decision to mean that the type of navigational purpose being served had
to be weighed against the type of property located within navigable waters
and affected by the navigational purpose. However, while the U.S.
Supreme Court in Cherokee Nation indicated that the navigational
servitude is an exception to the Takings Clause, the exception appears not
to depend upon balancing navigation-related interests but rather, upon a
determination that the private property interests are legitimately subject to
the navigational servitude. If not, they are compensable.
In summary, property rights within navigable waters are inferior to
the government's paramount power and dominant interest which render
other interests servient. Additionally, the navigational servitude's
historical basis in the public right of navigation places it outside the scope
of the Takings Clause. The navigational servitude has been interpreted
broadly by the courts and applied expansively by the federal government.
Yet the doctrine has its limits. It is not a "blanket exception to the
Takings Clause."'43 Rather, courts have considered five factors to help
them shape the scope of the navigational servitude.
39. Id. at 172-73 (reasoning that the fact that the body of water was subject to
regulation by the Corps of Engineers under the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act did
not make it subject to a public right of access).
40. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 179 (citing United States v. Chandler-
Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 69 (1913); United States v. Twin City Power Co.,
350 U.S. 222, 228 (1956)) (alteration in original).
41. Id.
42. The Court found that "even if the Government physically invades only an
easement in property, it must nonetheless pay just compensation." Id. at 180. For a
discussion of the Kaiser Aetna decision and its affect on takings law, see Maureen Straub
Kordesh, "I Will Build My House with Sticks: The Splintering of Property Interests Under
the Fifth Amendment May be Hazardous to Private Property, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
397, 430 (1996).
43. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. at 172.
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II. FIVE FACTORS THAT DEFINE THm SCOPE
OF THE NAVIGATIONAL SERVITUDE
In holding that a power company did not have a compensable interest
in the water power capacity of a navigable river, the U.S. Supreme Court,
in United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co.,' described the
(yet unnamed) navigational servitude as:
[The] power of use and control comes from the power to regulate
commerce between the States and with foreign nations. It
includes navigation and subjects every navigable river to the
control of Congress. All means having some positive relation to
the end in view which are not forbidden by some other provision
of the Constitution, are admissible. If, in the judgment of
Congress, the use of the bottom of the river is proper for the
purpose of placing therein structures in aid of navigation, it is not
thereby taking private property for a public use, for the owner's
title was in its very nature subject to that use in the interest of
public navigation. If its judgment be that structures placed in the
river and upon such submerged land, are an obstruction or
hindrance to the proper use of the river for purposes of naviga-
tion, it may require their removal and forbid the use of the bed
of the river by the owner in any way which in its judgment is
injurious to the dominant right of navigation.45
Discernible in the Court's description of the government's dominant
easement are the five factors further developed in subsequent case law:
congressional authorization, congressional discretion, Commerce Clause
purpose, location within navigable waters, and navigational purpose or
effect.
A. Congressional Authorization
The United States Constitution in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3
delegates to Congress the authority to regulate commerce. In Gibbons v.
Ogden,46 the Supreme Court established that commerce power encom-
44. 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
45. Id. at 62.
46. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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passes navigation. Power over navigation means control over navigable
waters.
Commerce includes navigation. The power to regulate com-
merce comprehends the control for that purpose, and to the
extent necessary, of all of the navigable waters of the United
States which are accessible from a State other than those in which
they lie. For this purpose they are the public property of the
nation, and subject to all requisite legislation by Congress.47
As holder of the power over commerce, the legislative branch
maintains controlling power over navigable waters. Thus, Congress could
declare a bridge lawful after the Supreme Court found it to be an obstruc-
tion to navigation. 48 Consistent with exclusive congressional power, even
the U.S. Supreme Court discusses the navigational servitude in terms of
Congress as the actor and an authorizing act of Congress.49
United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co. ,5 the universally
cited authority for the broad scope and expansive power of the naviga-
tional servitude, consistently names "Congress" as the actor and not
"government," "federal government," or "United States. "51 Admittedly,
the Chandler-Dunbar Court appeared to be concerned with establishing
the demarcation between congressional and judicial roles in relation to the
servitude. Making the congressional-judicial distinction probably accounts
for the Court's emphatic references to Congress and legislative functions.
The obvious message, nevertheless, is that some kind of appropriate
congressional authorization must ultimately back any exercise of the
servitude. "'For these purposes, Congress possesses all the powers which
existed in the States .... It is for Congress to determine when its full
power shall be brought into activity, and as to the regulations and sanc-
47. Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 724-25 (1865) (citing Gibbons
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)).
48. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 433-
34 (1855).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Cherokee Nation of Okla., 480 U.S. 700, 701-02
(1987).
50. 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
51. Id. The case is also cited for the judicial deference that the courts grant to
Congressional determinatons.
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tions which shall be provided. ' " Questions relating to navigation are
"legislative in character." 53
B. Congressional Discretion
Once Congress determines that a project improves or protects
navigation, the navigational servitude is available for accomplishing the
project.54 It is the navigational purpose of Congress, rather than the
express language of a statute, that establishes the availability of the
servitude.5 Thus, the broad power of Congress includes the discretion to
waive the servitude. Consequently, courts must determine whether
Congress acted under a power other than that of the Commerce Clause,
to declare a purpose other than aid of navigation, or whether to offer
compensation or damages when plaintiffs challenge governmental actions
under the navigational servitude. To overcome the servitude, congressio-
nal waiver must be explicit.56 This is not to say that only Congress itself
may waive the servitude; a duly authorized agent of Congress can effect
the waiver.57
To fall under the navigational servitude, an appropriation must be
made pursuant to Commerce Clause power.58 If an,act taken under the
navigational servitude does not further commerce, the act may result in a
compensable taking. For example, under the Federal Power Act of
1920, 59 a federal licensee was able to build a dam in outright violation of
52. Id. at 63 (quoting Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 725 (1865)).
53. Id. at 65.
54. United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 666 F.2d 1236, 1239 (9th Cir. 1982).
55. United States v. Commodore Park, Inc., 324 U.S. 386, 392 (1945).
56. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation v. United States, 964 F.2d 1102,
1119 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Nies, C.J., concurring), (quoting United States v. Cherokee Nation
of Okla., 480 U.S. 700, 707 (1987)).
57. For example, the Secretary of the Army, as a result of authorization to file
condemnation cases, can compromise exercise of the navigational servitude, without the
express consent of Congress. See United States v. 119.67 Acres of Land, 663 F.2d 1328,
1335 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d 597, 610 (3d
Cir. 1974)) (recognizing that a congressional act, "by its plain language contemplates
congressional consent to some encroachments on the navigational servitude, and delegates
to the Army Corps of Engineers and the Secretary of the Army authority to grant such
consent on its behalf.").
58. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 739-41 (1950)
(compensation authorized for riparian rights taken under the Reclamation Act).
59. 16 U.S.C §§ 791-825 (1994).
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state law but to be entitled to compensation.' Thus, the dominance of the
navigational servitude depends on the intent of Congress to further
commerce.
C. Commerce Clause Purpose
The Court has consistently interpreted congressional power over
navigable waters as broadly as congressional power over commerce
generally.
In our view, it cannot properly be said that the constitutional
power of the United States over its waters is limited to control for
navigation.... In truth the authority of the United States is the
regulation of commerce on its waters. Navigability... is but a
part of this whole. Flood protection, watershed development,
recovery of the cost of improvements through utilization of
power are likewise parts of commerce control .... The point
is that navigable waters are subject to national planning and
control in the broad regulation of commerce granted the Federal
Government.6
The Court has also stated: "[A]s repeatedly recognized by this Court...
the exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce may be aided by appropriate and needful control of activities
and agencies which, though intrastate, affect that commerce."62 Thus,
while courts have required actions under the navigational servitude to
have an underlying Commerce Clause purpose, the act itself does not
necessarily have to improve navigation.
In Coastal Petroleum Co. v. United States,63 the Court of Claims
upheld the use of the navigational servitude for removal of limestone from
the bottom of a navigable lake for use in a levee project.
60. First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
See also Powell, supra note 8, at 275, 284-86.
61. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 426 (1940)
(footnote omitted).
62. Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 526 (1941) (citations
omitted). See also United States v. Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229, 232-33
(1960); Conservation Council of N.C. v. Froehlke, 435 F. Supp. 775, 787 (M.D.N.C.
1977).
63. 524 F.2d 1206 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
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The statute under which many flood control undertakngs... are
authorized states that the projects are "for the benefit of naviga-
tion and the control of destructive floodwaters and other pur-
poses." Such a declaration has consistently been held conclusive
to determine the navigation purpose of a project .... We hold,
therefore, that the project involved here is entitled to the benefits
of the navigation servitude. 64
D. Property Must be Located within Navigable Waters
The location of property within navigable waters, rather than the type
of property interest or type of navigational use, determines the reach of
the navigational servitude. For instance, property located under, over, or
within navigable waters is subject to the servitude. This included an
oyster plantation on the bottom of a navigable bay, 65 as well as any
structure, whether actually obstructing navigation or merely located within
navigable waters. 66 The servitude constructively burdens uplands to the
extent that any of the lands' value is derived from a property interest in
the use or the flow of adjacent navigable waters.67
E. There Must be a Navigational Effect or Purpose
Although it appears sufficient for the relationship between navigation
and commerce to be quite general or even incidental, the servitude is
available for every government activity that occurs within navigable
waters. There must be some actual, if not necessarily major or direct,
positive relationship to navigation within the scope of commerce.6 8 The
Court described the navigational purpose requirement as:
64. Id. at 1210 (quoting Act of June 30, 1948, ch. 771, § 203, 62 Stat. 1175)
(citations omitted).
65. Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82 (1913).
66. See Bedford v. United States, 192 U.S. 217 (1904); Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson,
223 U.S. 605 (1912); Greenleaf Jomson Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U.S. 251 (1915);
Willink v. United States, 240 U.S. 572 (1916); Louisville Bridge Co. v. United States, 242
U.S. 409 (1917); United States v. Commodore Park, Inc., 324 U.S. 386 (1945).
67. See United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967).
68. See, e.g., James M. McElfish, Jr., Property Rights and Wetlands Regulation,
SA83 ALI-ABA 439 (May 1996) (discussing actions that meet the positive requirement
under the navigational servitude).
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The right of the United States in the navigable waters within the
several States is, however, "limited to the control thereof for the
purposes of navigation." Port of Seattle v. Oregon Railroad, 255
U.S. 56, 63 [(1921)]. And, while Congress, in the exercise of
this power, may adopt, in its judgment, any means having some
positive relation to the control of navigation and not otherwise
inconsistent with the Constitution, United States v. Chandler-
Dunbar Co., it may not arbitrarily destroy or impair the rights of
riparian owners by legislation which has no real or substantial
relation to the control of navigation or appropriateness to that
end. 6
9
The purpose of a project does not have to be navigational0 if the act
has some positive effect on navigation.71 Likewise, even though a project
may have an effect that appears unrelated to navigation or commerce
(such as taking limestone from the bottom of a lake), if the overall
purpose is appropriate (the levees built with the limestone improve the
navigable channel), it qualifies.
IV. THE FIVE FACTORS COALESCE INTO A SIx-PART TEST
TO DETERMINE THE VALIDITY OF ACTS
UNDER THE NAVIGATIONAL SERVITUDE
The nature of the navigational servitude and the factors that define the
servitude (Authority, Purpose, Intent, Location, Relationship to Naviga-
tion) form a six-part test taken from the body of case law, for determining
whether a proposed exercise of the navigational servitude is legitimate and
noncompensable.
A. Authority
Inquiry regarding authority is actually a two-part examination: (1) The
authorization prong asks if a relevant act of Congress exists. The act must
be under its Commerce Clause power, not under some other power, and
69. United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U.S. 411, 419 (1926)
(citation omitted).
70. For example, as previously mentioned, the Court in United States v. Appalachian
Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 426 (1940) accepted flood control as a valid commerce
power action.
71. Id.
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the act cannot expressly waive exercise of the servitude. (2) The delega-
tion prong tests whether specific congressional delegation of authority to
act is required. This prong also analyzes the level of discretion afforded
to government agencies as well as the level of judicial review provided by
the enabling statute.
Although the requisite congressional authorization to support a
navigational servitude may be implied from the navigational purpose of
a statute, such authorization does not eliminate the need for actual
delegation of statutory authority to an authorized agent for a particular
project. For example, United States v. Arizona held that a lack of
express congressional consent for a dam construction project, as required
by the Rivers and Harbors Authorization Act of 1899,73 prohibited action
by government officers, even though other acts of Congress applicable to
the project supported exercise of the navigational servitude. 74
In a recent case,75 a federal court ruled that U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers authority to order relocation of pipelines at the owner's expense
is reviewable under the River and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899.76
The project was authorized under the Flood Control Act of 1965,7 and
the pipelines were permitted under Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors
Act. 78 However, the Corps attempted to claim authority to require the
owner to relocate the pipeline as a general navigational purpose. The
Corps' authority under the Rivers and Harbors Act was subject to judicial
review under the Administrative Procedure Act. 79 The court found that
the Corps' authority conferred by the Flood Control Act did not negate
the accountability required by the Rivers and Harbors Act and the
Administrative Procedure Act. 0
72. 295 U.S. 174 (1935).
73. 33 U.S.C. § 401 (1994).
74. United States v. Arizona, 295 U.S. at 183-88.
75. United Tex. Transmission Co. v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 7 F.3d 436 (5th Cir.
1993).
76. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1994).
77. Pub. L. No. 89-298, 79 Stat. 1073 (Oct. 27, 1965) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1962d-5 (1988)).
78. United Tex. Transmission Co. v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 7 F.3d at 438.
79. Id. at 445 & n.29 (citing Bowles v. Army Corpr of Eng'rs, 841 F.2d 112, 116
(5th Cir. 1988); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988)).
80. Id. at 446.
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B. Commerce Clause Purpose
The Commerce Clause power is broadly construed, and a Commerce
Clause purpose may be either express or implied. Generally, the courts
will not question the judgment of Congress and its authorized agents about
whether a particular public purpose falls under the Commerce Clause and
hence qualifies for a navigational servitude. The courts will, however,
examine whether Congress or its agents have proceeded in a way that
moves outside the scope of the Commerce Clause power or have failed to
act within the scope of the power."'
In Blake v. United States, 81 involving a suit for damages to oyster
grounds overlapped by a Naval Mine Sweeping Practice Area, the court
found no right of action against the United States. From the court's
analysis, however, two questions emerged that appear to be generally
applicable in determining a Commerce Clause purpose: (1) Despite an
ostensible navigational purpose, has Congress, nevertheless, treated the
project in a way that takes it out of the scope of the commerce power?;
and (2) Where the government is acting primarily, or largely, for its own
benefit, does the project also still serve the general interest of
navigation? 3
The Blake plaintiffs relied on an earlier case, United States v. Gerlach
Live Stock Company,84 where the Court ruled there had been no authority
to regulate navigation despite an ostensible navigational purpose. The
Blake court found that, despite a congressional declaration:
the purpose of the project [on the San Joaquin River in Califor-
nia] was to improve navigation, the entire legislative history of
the enterprise showed that Congress had elected to treat the
matter as a reclamation project and to take state created rights
under its power of eminent domain. Since Congress itself in the
exercise of its power to promote the general welfare, determined
that the property owners were to be compensated the case was
81. Blake v. United States, 295 F.2d 91, 96 (4th Cir. 1961).
82. 295 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1961).
83. Id. at 96-97.
84. 339 U.S. 725 (1950).
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taken out of the field in which Congress proceeds under its power
to control navigation. 5
The Blake court distinguished Gerlach by finding that serving the
government's own purposes did not, by itself, take the project outside the
scope of the Commerce Clause power, so long as the project also served
the public and the general interests of navigation. 86
In United States v. Commodore Park, Inc.,87 the Court ruled that
dredging a bay to operate large seaplanes and depositing the dredged
material in a creek to make it part of a naval base, was a valid exercise of
the servitude. Serving purposes in addition to navigation did not invali-
date the servitude because the project affected navigable waters and was
exercised by an agent (the War Department) duly authorized by Congress
to alter navigable waters, and whose judgment the courts would not
normally question. 8
On the other hand, in United States v. 412.715 Acres of Land,89 the
court concluded that the government could not assert the navigational
servitude where construction of navigation improvements was for the
exclusive use of the Navy in connection with a naval fuel supply depot on
San Francisco Bay.90
In controlling, improving and regulating the navigability of
waters the Government traditionally acts for the benefit of the
navigating public. Unquestionably, it may deepen channels,
widen streams, erect lighthouses, build bridges, construct dams,
and make similar improvements, without compensating the
owners of land subject to the navigation servitude .... It does
not follow, however, that the Government may assert its power
over lands subject to this servitude to construct improvements for
85. Blake v. United States, 295 F.2d at 96 (citing United States v. Gerlach Live
Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950)).
86. Id. at 97-98.
87. 324 U.S. 386 (1945).
88. Id. at 390-93. See also Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931), Greenleaf
Johnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U.S. 251 (1915).
89. 53 F. Supp. 143 (N.D. Cal. 1943).
90. Since the government was, and intended to remain, in possession pursuant to
court order, the court denied dismissal as of right and concluded that it had jurisdiction to
consider whether the government was entitled to use the property without compensation
under the navigational servitude. United States v. 412.715 Acres of Land, 53 F. Supp. at
148.
330 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2:313
the exclusive use of one of its agencies; that it may appropriate
land for the construction of a naval fuel supply base, exclude
defendants and the general public from the use and benefit of the
facility, and claim that it is acting for the benefit of the public
under the navigation power.
Where the public is excluded the Government is not acting under
its power to improve navigation as a public utility, but under its
constitutional power to maintain a navy.9
That the Navy used navigable waters and acted generally for the public
good did not suffice to allow it to appropriate tidelands for its exclusive
benefit.'
Determining whether governmental action, in fact, falls within the
scope of the commerce power differs from determining whether there is
congressional intent to exercise a navigational servitude. If an act is found
to be outside the commerce power, congressional intent is irrelevant,
because the applicability of the navigational servitude is eliminated
entirely.
C. Congressional Intent
Finding an express or an implied Commerce Clause purpose leads to
a presumption that Congress intended to exercise the navigational servi-
tude. However, courts extend their examination to whether Congress, in
fact, intended to exercise "the full measure of its constitutional power,"
at least in cases where the government is not acting for a national purpose
but is, instead, furthering a local project. 93 According to the Ninth
Circuit, under some circumstances, congressional intent must be deter-
mined rather than presumed, and congressional intent to deny the servi-
tude may be inferred from statutory provisions.94
In Public Utility District No. 1 v. City of Seattle,95 the court decided
the issue of whether a state licensee has the same sovereign power under
91. Id. at 148-49.
92. Id. at 149. The court used the same analysis to reach the same decision in United
States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 53 F.Supp. 150 (N.D. Cal. 1943).
93. Pub. Utility Dist. No. 1 v. City of Seattle, 382 F.2d 666, 670 (9th Cir. 1967).
94. Id.
95. Id.
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a congressional enabling act to claim the navigational servitude as the
United States. The court conceded that the United States itself could have
exercised a navigational servitude to take lands belonging to the public
utility district that were covered by navigable waters.96 To draw its
distinction between the situation of the City of Seattle as a licensee and
that of the United States itself, the court analyzed the nature and the scope
of the interests involved. First, the court distinguished the relative
interests in property: an "easement of navigation" as opposed to the full
bundle of private property rights. 97 "It is thus apparent that the naviga-
tional servitude, by its nature, does not destroy or exclude all property
rights in the beds and banks of navigable streams. Such rights continue
to exist but are held subject to the governmental power in the nature of an
easement.""
Next, the court noted a lesser, and insufficient, public interest "to
warrant the assertion of national power" where a licensee is acting on a
local scale opposed to instances where the United States is acting in the
national interest. The licensee's interests are "state-created property
rights, often owned by the state itself" with some rate-based benefits to
power consumers, power company shareholders, and manufacturers. 9
Consequently, because of the lesser nature and scope of the federal
interests involved, Congress must decide not only to exercise its naviga-
tional servitude powers but also expressly bestow those powers on the
licensee.
"[E]xercise of that servitude, without making allowances for
preexisting rights under state law, requires clear authorization."
... The choice between the two groups of interests involves a
value judgment essentially legislative in character. Unless the
legislative intent is clear, courts should be slow to adopt a
96. Although the court focused on a licensee rather than the United States itself, it
noted that § 7(b) of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 800(b) (1964), requires the
Federal Power Commission to distinguish between projects that call for development by
the United States and those that can be accomplished by a licensee. Pub. Utility Dist. No.
1 v. City of Seattle, 382 F.2d at 670 n.3. The operative distinction, then, appears not to
be between a licensee and the United States itself, but, rather, between a local project, in
nature and scope, as opposed to a national one.
97. Pub. Utility Dist. No. 1 v. City of Seattle, 382 F.2d at 669 (citing United States
v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 at 228).
98. Id. at 669.
99. Id. at 670.
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construction the effect of which is a destruction of property
rights .... 100
The court conceded that the navigational servitude is available under such
circumstances without any balancing of interests if the congressional act
so states. However, the court does need to balance the interests to
determine the threshold question of congressional intent to exercise the
servitude.
Not only did the court find, under these circumstances, that examina-
tion to determine legislative intent is required, it concluded that the
Federal Power Act must be interpreted as denying exercise of the servi-
tude. 10' The court cited United States v. Twin City Power Co., ° for the
proposition that "legislative history and construction of particular enact-
ments may lead to the conclusion that Congress exercised less than its
constitutional power .... "1 3 According to Federal Power Commission
v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., ° the Federal Power Act does not
expressly abolish any existing proprietary rights nor make any express
assertion of the paramount right of the Government; and, according to
Henry Ford & Son, Inc. v. Little Falls Fibre Co.,0 5 sections 10(c) and 27
of the Federal Water Power Act require compensation for the taking of
state-created property rights.
The court summarized by citing its own decision in United States v.
Central Stockholders' Corp. 06
The Supreme Court held in the Ford Case, in effect, that it was
not the intention of Congress to vest any portion of its sovereign
power in the permittee, and, assuming that the Government might
have exercised its control over navigable streams by and through
a permittee under the Federal Water Power Act, that it was not
the intention of the government so to do.'°7
100. Id. (quoting Fed. Power Comm'n v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S.
239, 249 (1954)).
101. Id. at 670-71.
102. 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
103. Pub. Utility Dist. No. 1 v. City of Seattle, 382 F.2d at 671 (quoting United
States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. at 225).
104. 347 U.S. 239, 250 (1954).
105. 280 U.S. 369, 378-79 (1930).
106. 52 F.2d 322 (9th Cir. 1931).
107. Pub. Utility Dist. No. I v. City of Seattle, 382 F.2d at 671 (quoting United
States v. Cent. Stockholders' Corp., 52 F.2d 322, 332 (9th Cir. 1931)).
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By failing to invest a licensee with its sovereign power, there is no
presumption that Congress intended the navigational servitude be exer-
cised. Lack of power to assert the navigational servitude means that any
shorelands necessary to the licensee's projects must be taken by eminent
domain condemnation with compensation.'
D. Easement
Case law demonstrates that the property interest acquired by a
governmental act must be limited to an easement to be entitled to the
navigational servitude. Governmental acts acquiring fee simple title
appear to preclude the need to determine whether the government
intended to exercise the servitude. For example, when the government,
by condemnation took fee simple title in riparian tidelands, the court held
that the government made an election to use its eminent domain powers,
regardless of whether the intended use would have been a permissible
exercise of the navigational servitude. 1°9 Because the United States had
taken title rather than an easement, appellee's riparian rights had not been
merely subjected to the government's dominant servitude, but had been
permanently taken."10
In contrast, in Continental Land Co. v. United States,' no compensa-
ble interest was found in the potential use of riparian land as a dam site on
the Columbia River, just as there was no compensable interest in the
adjacent shorelands (owned by the State of Washington), when the United
States undertook to develop the river for the purpose of improving
navigation. Similarly, a property owner had no claim against the United
States for the use of water or water power, both of which are held subject
to the government's dominant servitude, just as the value of the land as a
dam site would not be a proper element for determining just compensa-
tion.112
108. Id. at 672-73.
109. United States v. 11.48 Acres of Land, 212 F.2d 853 (5th Cir. 1954).
110. The court chose not to reach the question of whether appropriate exercise of the
servitude would have been legitimate. The appellee had, alternatively, argued that the
government's purpose, storing a "moth ball fleet" of inactive naval vessels, was merely
permanent storage and not entitled to exercise of the servitude over navigable waters. Id.
at 855.
111. 88 F.2d 104 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 715 (1937).
112. Id. at 110-11.
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Although the Continental Land court found no compensable interest,
whereas the 11.48 Acres of Land court determined that there was a
compensable interest, the two are distinguishable. The difference lies in
the nature of the interest taken: the former being an easement and the
latter being the fee interest. Thus, these cases apparently refine the notion
that ownership fights in aquatic lands are superseded by the navigational
servitude by limiting the reach of the servitude to an easement. Once the
government takes more than an easement, the navigational servitude no
longer makes the taking noncompensable.
E. Governmental Act is within Navigable Waters
The reach of the navigational servitude is confined to the boundaries
of navigable waters. To qualify for the navigational servitude, a project
must be located within navigable waters at the time that it is proposed. It
cannot be bootstrapped to provide use of the adjacent upland without
compensation.114
Bootstrapping was struck down in United Texas Transmission v. Army
Corps of Engineers."5 The court rejected the Corps' attempt to exercise
the servitude over land outside the original banks of a stream that it had
widened.
The proposition that the navigational servitude extends beyond
the original banks of the stream (outside the navigable waters of
the United States) is insupportable-as is the "bootstrap" proposi-
tion that the very act of widening the bayou brings "within
navigable waters" the land previously lying outside the original
banks but affected by the widening, thereby making it subject to
the servitude retroactively.1 6
The decision in Kaiser Aetna additionally rejected bootstrapping of
property rights. In addition to disallowing exercise of the servitude in an
area not originally located within navigable waters, the Court also struck
113. Owen v. United States, 851 F.2d 1404 (Fed. Cir. 1988), remanded, 20 CI. Ct.
574 (1994).
114. Id. at 1412, 1417.
115. 7 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 1993).
116. Id. at 443.
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down the exercise of the servitude to obtain a right of public access to an
area not originally open to public access.
11 7
Citing Kaiser Aetna, Dardar v. Lafourche Realty Co. 11 stated that a
navigational servitude ordinarily extends only to naturally navigable
waters.119 It is a "natural servitude," confined to navigable waters in their
natural condition."2 The Dardar court ruled that the servitude did not
reach waters on private property made navigable by the property owners.
It outlined the Supreme Court's four-factor test from Kaiser Aetna to
negate the reach of the navigational servitude. The court found that the
water body at issue: (1) had not been navigable in its natural state and was
not like major natural water bodies; (2) was on private property under
state law; (3) was converted to a. navigable water body by private parties
with private funds; and (4) the conversion was approved by the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers.'
F. Positive Relationship Between the Governmental
Activity and Navigation
Where a positive relationship to navigation (either a purpose or an
effect) is lacking, the courts have refused to uphold the exercise of the
navigational servitude. In United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., a dam
reclamation case, the Court firmly stated: "this Court has never permitted
the Government to pervert its navigation servitude into a right to destroy
riparian interests without reimbursement where no navigation purpose
existed."' The Court held that even though Congress included dams
under its power to control navigation, the dam at issue was for reclama-
tion and, therefore, the claimant's right to overflow of a navigable river
was compensable.
Similarly, in United States v. 50 Foot Right of Way," a court rejected
a claim based on the navigational servitude for a pipeline, finding the
pipeline did not aid navigation or have a positive relation to the control of
117. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979).
118. 985 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1993).
119. The Court stated that navigability as a result of any kind of erosion counts as
natural. Id. at 833.
120. United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 325-26 (1917).
121. Darbar v. Lafourche Realty Co., 985 F.2d at 832, 834 (citing Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. at 178-79).
122. 339 U.S. 725, 737 (1950).
123. 337 F.2d 956 (3d Cir. 1964).
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navigation. Although it seems as though a pipeline might qualify under
the commerce power (if a flood control dam can), it lacked a navigational
aspect. 124
In sum, the manner in which that courts have applied the factors that
determine the basis and nature of the navigational servitude amounts to a
six-part test to determine the legitimacy of the claim. Legitimate exercise
of the federal navigational servitude appears, therefore, to require: (1)
congressional authority in the form of both authorization and delegation;
(2) an actual rather than merely nominal Commerce Clause purpose; (3)
congressional intent to exercise the full extent of its commerce power; (4)
exercise of no more than an easement; (5) that property be located
originally within navigable waters; and (6) a navigational purpose or
effect.
G. Additional Considerations
In addition to the six-part test to determine legitimate exercise of the
federal navigational servitude, additional issues such as burden of proof,
due process and reasonable action, and concurrency must be considered
by the courts in cases questioning the validity of acts taken under the
navigational servitude.
1. Burden of Proof
The burden of proof generally falls on the proponent of an action.
For example, the burden of proof rests upon the asserting party when the
issue is the navigability of a body of water for purposes of federal
jurisdiction.1" By analogy, an argument can be made that the burden of
proof should be on the federal government when the issue is the availabil-
ity of the navigational servitude for purposes of the commerce power.
2. Due Process and Reasonable Action
It appears that both constitutional due process requirements and the
doctrine of reasonable action are applicable to exercises of the naviga-
tional servitude.
124. Id. at 960.
125. United States v. Harrell, 926 F.2d 1036 (11th Cir. 1991); Goose Creek Hunting
Club, Inc. v. United States, 518 F.2d 579 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
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In United States v. 119.67Acres of Land," the court held that the
United States had "effectively surrendered or compromised away its
navigational servitude."" Although the government did not make clear
any intent to waive the servitude, the court found that Congress had
delegated authority to the Secretary of the Army to "surrender" the
servitude." The Secretary began condemnation proceedings on the belief
that the land in question was not subject to the servitude either because of
the location of certain segments of the property or because of congressio-
nal appropriation of funds for land acquisition. The court found that the
Secretary could not institute condemnation proceedings, negotiate a
compensation agreement, and then vacate the agreement and rather
attempt to assert the navigational servitude, if he had erroneously failed
to exercise the power initially.12 The court applied due process require-
ments to the navigational servitude on the basis that the commerce power
generally was subject to the Fifth Amendment, citing United States v.
Stoeco Homes as holding "though the Congressional power over the
regulation of commerce is far reaching that power is limited by the due
process and takings clauses of the Fifth Amendment."13 The fact that the
navigational servitude is an exception to the Takings Clause would not,
apparently, necessarily mean that it is also an exception to due process
requirements.
In addition to due process requirements, in United States v. 5.96
Acres of Land,3 1 the Ninth Circuit ruled that governmental acts must be
reasonable. The court affirmed that no compensation was due for damage
to structures belonging to a lessee of the State of Washington aquatic
lands. The court found that the United States has the "power to place
reasonable conditions on private use of public waterways."132 However,
the court also noted that "[a]ny special relationship that exists between the
United States and potential users of the nation's waterways is assured by
the requirement that the United States must always act reasonably and in
the public interest.""'
126. 663 F.2d 1328 (5th Cir. 1981).
127. Id. at 1337.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1337-38.
130. Id. (quoting United States v. Stoeco Homes, 498 F.2d 597, 611 (3d Cir. 1974)).
131. 593 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1979).
132. Id. at 890.
133. Id. at 890 n.8.
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3. Concurrency of State and Federal Interests
Finally, the concurrent sovereignty of the United States and the states
apparently requires the United States to show that a proposed action is
legitimately within the sphere of federal constitutional powers. While a
state, as an attribute of sovereignty, has original ownership of and
resultant jurisdiction over its aquatic lands, 34 the federal government's
powers in relation to these lands are limited by constitutional purposes.
[Territorial grants by Congress of public lands] do not impair the
title and dominion of the future State when created; but leave the
question of the use of the shores by the owners of uplands to the
sovereign control of each State, subject only to the rights vested
by the Constitution in the United States. 35
The rights of the federal government within the navigable waters of
the states are limited to control of navigation under the Commerce
Clause. 36 Federal power to control navigation in general does not confer
or create any property rights. 137 States, however, can properly maintain
or create property rights in tidelands.13 8 Encounters between state-created
property rights and the federal government's powers under the Commerce
Clause have contributed to the development of navigational servitude
doctrine.139 Although property interests arise from state law, federal
constitutional law determines whether the state-created interest arise to the
level of property protected by the Fifth Amendment; 4 ° that is, whether a
compensable taking has occurred, or whether appropriate exercise of the
navigational servitude under the Commerce Clause power obviates
compensation. 141
134. See Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 302 U.S. 186, 198 (1937).
135. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 58 (1894).
136. See John Scott Obenour, Jr., Water Boundaries, Tide and Shore Land Rights,
23 WASH. L. RaV. 235 (1948).
137. See Port of Seattle v. Oregon & Washington R.R. Co., 255 U.S. 56, 63 (1921).
138. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 475 (1988).
139. Donnell v. United States, 834 F. Supp. 19, 26-27 (D. Me. 1993).
140. Id. at 24 (citing Hoffman v. Warwick, 909 F.2d 608, 615 (lst Cir. 1990)).
141. Id. at 25-26.
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V. CONCLUSION
The federal navigational servitude appears to exist somewhere in the
shadow of the Fifth Amendment. It is: an incident of federal Commerce
Clause power, an easement rather than fee title, and by definition,
noncompensable. It is clear that property rights within navigable waters
are subservient to the government's paramount power and dominant
interest. Furthermore, the navigational servitude has been interpreted
broadly by the courts and applied expansively by the federal government.
Yet the doctrine has its limits.
Courts have considered constitutional and factual factors that form
a discernible six-part test to determine the legitimacy of the navigational
servitude. Congress must intend and give authority to the government to
act under the Commerce Clause power, and the act must make use of no
more than an easement in navigable waters for a purpose related to
navigation. Additionally, the exercise of the commerce power may be
subject to due process, or at the very least, reasonable action, on the part
of the government.
Still, the State of Washington has recently encountered new circum-
stances at the outer reaches of the scope of the navigational servitude. For
example, is environmental monitoring or mitigation, legitimately within
the scope of the navigational servitude? 142 Can the United States take a
leasehold in a state-owned harbor area without paying rent?4 3 Can a
federal agency make its navigational servitude claim in a letter of intent
without providing further notice or admnistrative procedure?'" This
Comment is an attempt to help answer these and other questions. It would
appear that a constitutionally adequate determination of these questions
142. Grays Harbor Mitigation Site-The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers claimed a
site to be under the navigational servitude for habitat restoration to mitigate the destruction
of oyster resources as a result of channel dredging.
143. Port of Seattle Harbor Area-The United States Coast Guard took assignment
from the Port of Seattle of a harbor area lease. Rents were overdue. Claiming use of the
site under the navigational servitude, the Coast Guard has refused to pay any rent, past or
future. At a nearby site, which the Coast Guard purchased, the seller sought to cancel the
state lease of the adjacent harbor area, because the Coast Guard claimed the leased area
under the navigational servitude. The Coast Guard was developing these sites as a support
center.
144. White River Monitoring Station-The Corps of Engineers claimed a site under
the navigational servitude in connection with flood control and water quality monitoring.
The Corps communicated its intent by letter and maintained that nothing further was
required.
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requires an inquiry pursuant to the six-part test discussed here as well as
considering due process and the reasonableness of the governmental acts.
